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BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INVESTOR PROTECTION: A NEW 
APPROACH FOR A DIFFERENT 
LEGAL ORDER 
ToDD WEILER* 
Abstract: Recognizing the political need to show that transnational 
investors should shoulder "responsibilities" in addition to the inter-
national "rights" to which they are granted access under investment 
protection treaties, this Article proposes a sort of "counterclaim" 
mechanism for use in future treaties. The mechanism would permit 
individuals who live in countries receiving foreign investment to bring 
claims against foreign investors for the violation of serious international 
rules by their agents or employees operating in the host country. Such 
rules would include safeguards for international human rights that might 
be violated in the operation of an investment, as has been documented 
recently before U.S. courts operating under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
The Article concludes by providing an appendix with draft text that could 
be adopted by the negotiators of future bilateral investment treaties. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past five decades, the character of the international legal 
order has changed considerably in terms of norm development, the 
scope of regulated activity, and the actors upon whom international 
obligations fall. These changes have been brought about through an 
evolutionary process most often referred to as "globalization," whereby 
enhanced telecommunications, data technology developments, and 
dramatically increased flows in trade and transnational investment have 
altered the socioeconomic relationships that exist among states and 
between states and non-state actors. 
*Todd Weiler, MA & LLB (Western Ontario), LLM (Ottav.<t), LLM (Michigan), is an 
international trade lawyer who specializes in investor-state arbitrations. He is an Adjunct 
Professor at the Washington College of Law at American UniYersity in Washington, D.C. 
and a Research Fellow & Lecturer at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law and 
Policy at the University of Dundee in Scotland. Professor Weiler maintains a leading web-
site on investor-state claims, www.naftalaw.org, and is currently completing a SJD at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. He can be reached at tweiler@naftalaw.org. 
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These technological advances, along with the adoption of interna-
tional economic obligations under multilateral trade and bilateral in-
vestment treaties, have facilitated dramatic increases in global trade and 
investment and have permitted private economic actors to take advan-
tage of more efficient global operations. International economic obli-
gations have been designed to facilitate global trade, and thus can be 
seen as safeguarding the interests of private firms, even though their 
prosecution can only be undertaken through state-to-state dispute set-
tlement. Moreover, through the development of a web of approxi-
mately 2000 bilateral treaties among approximately 170 countries, pri-
vate actors have been provided with the right to prosecute core eco-
nomic obligations through direct arbitration with a state. 
Mixed arbitration for the protection of foreign investors has ac-
tually existed for centuries, but until the 1960s it was normally pur-
sued on an ad hoc basis through subrogation of a private actor's claim 
by its "home" state (i.e., the state of citizenship or incorporation). The 
exponential multiplication of bilateral investment treaties that has 
taken place since the 1960s-which gained considerable steam in the 
1980s-has institutionalized the right of non-state actors to pursue 
mixed arbitration. Thus, on the economic front, international treaty 
norms have taken on a character that is clearly different from the 
state-centered obligations of past centuries. 
Over roughly the same period, international human rights norms 
have also blossomed at an exponential rate. Much like economic obli-
gations, most of these international human rights obligations possess 
the constitutional character of norms designed to protect individuals as 
against activities of the state. Analogous to economic obligations, inter-
national human rights obligations have become, in many cases, prose-
cutable by non-state actors before impartial, international decision-
making bodies. However, despite the fact that international economic 
and human rights obligations share a focus on protecting non-state ac-
tors and often provide an individualized mechanism for enforcement, 
there is one notable distinction: the effectiveness of enforcement. 
Much has been written about the relative effectiveness of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process vis-a-vis other 
forms of dispute settlement. But less has been written about the supe-
rior effectiveness of investor-state arbitration, under which a state 
must submit itself to commercial arbitration with a foreign investor 
(based upon a general statement of consent contained within the 
relevant treaty). ·while a mixed claims tribunal can only award com-
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pensation as relief, its award is normally eminently enforceable in 
most developed countries.1 
With its inclusion in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), mixed claims arbitration has become increasingly more 
popular, as investors have brought claims under investment rules that 
heretofore would have been brought (if at all) by their home states. 
Increased usage of these mechanisms has brought with it increased no-
toriety. Mixed claims arbitration has thus become the cause celebre of 
anti-globalization groups concerned that the phenomenon of global-
ization has had a deleterious effect on living conditions throughout the 
world, particularly in the developing world. When it became widely 
known that states holding membership in the Organization of Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had begun negotia-
tions on a multilateral investment protection agreement in 1996, con-
cerned activists argued that the agreement would constitute a "corpo-
rate bill of rights" with no corresponding obligations to regulate the 
activities of its beneficiaries. 2 
What these activists were essentially calling for is a quid pro quo: 
in exchange for international protection from potential abuses at the 
hands of host governments, corporations were to be held accountable 
for abuses for which they would be responsible under international 
law. This is different from the exchange that has historically typified 
such relationships, where the corporation submits itself to the disci-
plines of local law in exchange for international protection for its in-
vestment. In other words, the exchange had always been international 
protection in exchange for a foreigner's commitment to invest. Has 
the time come for a change? 
This Article explores the nature and modalities of the appropri-
ate exchange that should be taking place today in light of the changes 
to the international legal order that globalization has wrought. This 
new legal order is one that increasingly recognizes individual rights, 
as against state action, in an almost quasi-constitutional pattern. This 
new legal order is one in which a plethora of treaties and interna-
1 Enforcement is maintained through the inclusion of provisions in in\·estment treaties 
that permit enforcement under international conventions. See generally Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
2 See, e.g., Andrea Durbin & Mark Vallianatos, 'Transnational C01porate Bill of Rights~ 
Negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl), http:/ /www.globalpolicy.org/ 
socecon/bwi-wto/mail.htm (Apr. 1997); see also Public Citizen, The Alarming Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAl) Now Being Negotiated at the OECD, at http:/ /www.citiz-
en.org/trade/issues/mai/Opposition/articles.cfm?ID=5625 (last visited Apr. 26, 2004). 
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tional judicial doctrine have established and refined minimum stan-
dards for government action. However, notable cleavages remain be-
tween the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms in the economic 
fields of trade and investment, as compared to the equally important 
fields of human rights, environment, and labor. 
Part I of this Article outlines the lack of respect for human rights 
that has been attributed to the operations of foreign-owned enter-
prises in the developing world. Part II describes the voluntary codes 
of corporate conduct that have been adopted in response and ad-
dresses their fundamental weaknesses. Part III advances a solution to 
address these weaknesses-the inclusion of a human rights claim 
mechanism in all future international investment protection agree-
ments-and then outlines some of the fundamental elements of the 
proposed mechanism (including the basis for finding liability and 
awarding compensation). While Part IV explores different bases of 
liability under a human rights claim mechanism, Part V analyzes the 
choice of obligations under the proposed mechanism and objections 
to its use. The Appendix of this Article presents draft treaty provisions 
that, if added to bilateral investment protection agreements, would 
serve to implement a human rights claim mechanism. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: LAcK OF RESPECT FOR 
HuMAN RIGHTS BY MNEs 
Critics of foreign direct investment in developing countries argue 
that there is a pressing need for rules governing the conduct of mul-
tinational enterprises (MNEs). As one author has noted: "such entities 
are inherently difficult [domestic] regulatory targets, with enormous 
economic and political strength and the ability to move assets and op-
erations around the world. "3 Other critics have stated: 
Many MNEs' revenues today surpass the gross domestic 
products of several independent nation-states. MNEs' wealth, 
resources, and information technology make them key play-
ers not only within the nation-states in which they operate, 
but also in the international arena. Some MNEs have more 
to say about policies that govern international trade and 
finance than do many of the less developed countries. Yet, 
driven by the search for profit, MNEs are often unaware of, 
s Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 
24 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 401,401 (2001). 
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or simply disregard, the adverse impact that their activities 
may and often do have on the spectrum of human rights.4 
[The] international scene is no longer just about formal, 
diplomatic relations between states-it has witnessed the 
emergence of increasingly powerful non-state actors; power-
ful in the sense that their activities have a major and direct 
impact on the lives of millions of people .... The problem is 
that their power is not matched by a corresponding degree 
of responsibility and accountability. Some MNEs have a 
budget that far exceeds that of many developing countries-
and still, there is no mechanism to hold them accountable 
for the violations of human rights that their activities gener-
ate. In many developing countries where these MNEs oper-
ate, the rule of law is ineffective; there are no legal remedies, 
and no possibilities of redress-which goes to say that the 
MNEs can act in near-total impunity.5 
433 
It has accordingly been argued that a downward regulatory spiral 
(or a "race to the bottom") has ensued from competition among devel-
oping countries in order to attract foreign direct investment. Faced 
with competition, developing countries may relax or fail to enforce 
domestic regulatory standards-including human rights standards-to 
the detriment of the health and well-being of their citizens. vVhether 
the proof exists to sufficiently justify these theories on a macroeco-
nomic level is an open question. Is it fair to say that foreign direct in-
vestment, once it has been committed to a particular country, is as 
highly mobile as these theories would suggest? Is it also fair to say that 
large, wealthy transnational corporations are really more powerful than 
the governments or leaders of numerous developing countries? 
VVhile it may not be clear that transnational corporations (both 
large and small) wield the power alleged by some of their harshest crit-
ics, there is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that foreign 
enterprises operating investments in the developing world have com-
mitted, or been complicit in, environmental, labor, and human rights 
abuses. Human Rights Watch has published extensive reports that pur-
4 Christina Baez et al., Multinational Enterp1ises and Human Rights, 8 U. MIAMI lNT'L & 
CoMP. L. REv. 183, 184-85 (2000) (citations omitted). 
5 Anne-Christine Habbard, The Integration of Human Rights in C01porate Principles, in 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES FOR MuL-
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 99 (2001) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]. 
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port to document human rights abuses undertaken in connection with 
foreign direct investment in numerous locations. For example, in India, 
a subsidiary enterprise of Enron Corporation has allegedly maintained 
extremely close ties to a local government that has allegedly engaged in 
the violent and unlawful repression of local protesters against the de-
velopment of a hydroelectric project.6 Similarly, in the Niger Delta, po-
litical protests against the participation of transnational oil companies, 
such as Chevron and Shell, have allegedly met with brutal, systemic re-
pression by government security forces. 7 Others have noted how trans-
national corporations have benefited from the lower production costs 
that can be obtained through systemic violations of core labor and an-
tidiscrimination standards in Asia and Latin America.8 
II. THE ALLEGED SoLUTION: VoLUNTARY ConEs 
OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 
In response to such high-profile reports, individual corporations, 
international organizations, and industry groups have developed and 
implemented a series of codes of corporate conduct. Some codes fo-
cus particularly on the trading activities of individual firms (i.e., the 
procurement and foreign outsourcing practices), adopting basic labor 
and nondiscrimination standards. Others are industry-specific and 
govern both trade practices and the conduct of foreign investment 
enterprises. Finally, there is a class of codes developed by interna-
tional organizations that intends to apply universally to all transna-
tional and local business organizations. This latter class of codes in-
cludes instruments developed by state-controlled organizations, such 
as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or the United 
Nations (U.N.) Global Compact and instruments developed by indus-
try-controlled organizations, including the Global Sullivan Principles 
and the Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000) Standard. 
6 Human Rights Watch, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human 
Rights Violations, at http:/ /www.hrw.org/ reports/ 1999 I enron/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2004). 
7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA's OIL PRODUCING CoMMUNITIES (1999), http:/ /www.hrw. 
org/reports/1999/nigeria/ [hereinafter THE PRICE OF OIL]. 
8 Jenness Duke, Enforcement of Human Rights of Multinational Corporations: Global Climate, 
Strategies and Trends for Compliance, 28 DENVERJ. Irn'L L. & PoL'Y 339, 343-44 (2000); Prin-
ciples Relating to the Human Rights Conduct of Companies: Working Paper Prepared by Mr. David 
Weissbrodt, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 
4, para. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.1 (2000). 
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One key characteristic shared by each of these codes is their volun-
tary character. Other shared characteristics of these codes include the 
active participation of non-state actors in developing them and their 
common reference to human rights obligations contained within in-
ternational treaties. The adoption of a voluntary approach to the regu-
lation of transnational corporations in such an important area as 1m-
man rights seems to indicate a tacit acknowledgement by the drafters of 
these codes that there exists only the most limited of means whereby 
these norms can be enforced. This is not to say that such means do not 
exist, for every state maintains the sovereign political and regulatory 
authority to adopt and enforce human rights codes; rather, it is only 
that their adoption and universal enforcement does not appear immi-
nent. This is true notwithstanding the reality that the changing interna-
tional legal order urgently requires a delineation of the rights and re-
sponsibilities of non-state actors, such as transnational corporations and 
the investment enterprises that they own or control abroad: 
Large, highly visible corporations now coexist alongside 
smaller companies that also have international reach. The 
borders of the firm have become blurred, as companies have 
deepened and extended relationships in supply chains as 
well as other business partnerships. As a result, the [OECD] 
Guidelines and other global instruments for corporate re-
sponsibility face the task of giving meaning to the concept of 
business responsibility in a context where business entities 
themselves are often quite fuzzy and where the associated 
challenges of control and monitoring-both by companies 
and by societies-have become more complex. This height-
ens the challenge of putting in place an appropriate frame-
work for global governance.9 
Voluntary codes can be a useful element of a larger regulatory 
regime when used in an educative role and in coordination with other 
tools for maintaining compliance. For example, moral suasion can be 
brought to bear upon transnational corporations through informa-
tion campaigns in their "home" markets, and local tort law may be 
used to retroactively address alleged abuses. 10 However, it is essential 
9 Summary of Roundtable Discussion, in OECD GuiDELINES, supm note 5, at 51-52 (sum-
marizing comments made by Pieter Kroon) . 
' 0 Of course, this avenue can be limited by deficient local legal regimes. There is also 
the potential application of the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), but 
the exorbitant costs of litigation and the vagaries of U.S. procedural law-such as the re-
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under any regulatory model (international or otherwise) that a 
credible threat of enforcement exists that can be implemented with 
adequate monitoring and verification processes.l1 This fact has not 
been lost on the critics of corporate responsibility as manifested in 
voluntary codes, one of whom recently noted: 
[C]ompanies do not spontaneously want to be regulated ... 
one cannot grant them the benefit of the doubt when it 
comes to the implementation of such charters .... For 
companies to satisfactorily implement their charter, the same 
type of pressure as that which led to its adoption has to be 
applied, which means that an independent and credible enforce-
ment procedure has to be put in place.12 
The enforcement of these codes is only possible through 
sufficient monitoring and reporting activities. Some firm-specific 
codes make use of third party auditing; however, many of the univer-
sal codes (such as the U.N. Global Compact) appear to be relying ex-
clusively upon the interest and ability of non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty Interna-
tional, to assume this role without allocating any resources for the 
performance of these crucial duties.13 Moreover, without the availabil-
ity of an independent adjudicator to interpret and apply the norms 
contained within any given corporate code, self-serving corporations 
or their agents could easily use the indeterminacy of language as a 
means of establishing "public relations compliance" rather than the 
real thing. 
Given the apparent weaknesses of the plethora of voluntary codes 
that have appeared over the past decade, a sessional working group of a 
sub-committee of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights recently 
commissioned a report by Professor David Weissbrodt on the possibility 
of developing a binding code of conduct for transnational corporations 
quirement of personal jurisdiction and fornm nonconveniens-can limit the availability of 
this remedy to all but a few claimants. See Stephens, supra note 3, at 407-12. 
11 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & joHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); jOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRANDS, GLOBAL BUSI-
NESS REGULATION (2000). 
12 Habbard, supra note 5, at 101 (emphasis ir1 origmal). 
13 Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Kofi An-
nan, United Nations Secretary-General (July 28, 2000), http:/ /www.hrw.org/press/2000/ 
07 /hrw-ltrjuly.htm. 
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based upon international human rights standards.14 The product of 
Professor Weissbrodt's work-a draft "Guidelines" document-does not 
appear to be headed for formal adoption by U.N. members as a bind-
ing code any time soon. Nonetheless, pursuant to a decision of the sub-
committee on August 15, 2001, refinement of the document will con-
tinue under the supervision of Professor Weissbrodt and the working 
group.l5 For the time being, however, there exists no immediate pros-
pect of a multilateral code that could govern the universal application 
of human rights norms to the activities of transnational corporations. 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIM MECHANISM: AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION? 
As discussed earlier, there have been suggestions that a quid pro 
quo exchange of obligations should be imposed upon transnational 
investors who wish to take advantage of the protections afforded by an 
international investment treaty. While the prospect of a multilateral 
agreement on investment appears to be far off,16 states continue to 
agree upon bilateral investment protection treaties. The potential ex-
ists for insertion of an enforcement mechanism in these bilateral 
agreements-an enforcement mechanism, such as the one proposed 
in the Appendix, for the prosecution of human rights violations 
committed by private parties whose activities will be protected under 
such agreements. 
The major flaw of existing codes of corporate conduct and of the 
use of domestic tort mechanisms, such as the U.S. Alien Tort Claims 
Act, is their lack of enforceabilityP For corporate codes, additional 
flaws exist in the lack of an impartial, independent adjudicatory 
mechanism to forge meaning out of indeterminate legal terms. Inclu-
sion of an enforcement mechanism in bilateral investment agree-
14 The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Question of Transnational 
Corporations, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 4(c), 
para. 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/9 (1999). 
15 The Effects of the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations on the En-
joyment of Human Rights, ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., para. 4, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/3 (2001). 
16 The OECD negotiations on a multilateral investment agreement collapsed in 1997 
under the weight of fundamental disagreements as to the scope and coverage of an 
agreement between OECD members and because of the relative lack of interest on the 
part of international businesses (who appeared unwilling to publicly support the negotia-
tions when they came under a belated attack by anti-globalization groups). 
17 See Baez et al., supra note 4, at 319 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1980)). In Filartiga, multimillion dollar awards were made against the defendant for 
the infliction of torture upon the claimants but were never enforced by the courts of Hon-
duras. See id. 
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ments would largely address such weaknesses. This is because awards 
made under such a mechanism could be made enforceable on the 
same basis that awards made against a state party for a successful in-
vestment claim are enforceable by a claimant. Through the introduc-
tion of only a few added provisions, such as those suggested in the 
Appendix, the adjudication of human rights claims brought by af-
fected individuals could be undertaken by an ad hoc tribunal estab-
lished and operated on a basis similar to that under which investment 
claims can be pursued under the relevant treaty. 
Most bilateral investment treaties provide the investor with a 
choice of commercial arbitration rules under which to bring a claim. 
The appropriateness of these rules for investment disputes has been 
questioned over the past few years, particularly with regard to whether 
hearings should be held in camera. However, the drafters of future 
treaty texts need only make minor changes to ensure openness of fu-
ture proceedings. The rules themselves are general in scope, leaving 
considerable leeway for a tribunal to adopt the practices and proce-
dures that suit the circumstances of the claim to be heard. Accord-
ingly, the addition of potential compensation claims for the violation 
of human rights by an investor/investment would not be difficult to 
accommodate. 
Investment treaties also generally provide for the claimant's choice 
of at least one of the would-be arbitrators, as well as designation of an 
appointing authority. Whereas investment claimants might choose eco-
nomic law scholars or lawyers, human rights claimants would probably 
choose human rights scholars or adjudicators (i.e., persons who have 
experience sitting on state-to-state human rights tribunals). 
Moreover, whereas the integrity of domestic regulators and courts 
could be questioned with respect to the uniform and nondiscrimina-
tory application of international human rights norms in any given 
country, tribunals established under a human rights protection mecha-
nism-such as the one proposed herein-would not necessarily suffer 
from similar attacks on their credibility or impartiality. An international 
tribunal would hear prospective claims of ill-treatment at the hands of 
an investor/investment, with an international mandate and interna-
tional law expertise rather than a local tribunal with no international 
law experience and potentially conflicting mandates. 
The proposed claim mechanism would provide for the opportu-
nity to receive compensation directly from the offending hives-
tor/investment. Such a mechanism would potentially represent a con-
siderable improvement over the use of a trade-sanctions mechanism 
for alleged human rights violations. The proposed mechanism would 
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simply be more economically efficient than the establishment of any 
trade-sanctions mechanism, because trade-sanctions mechanisms con-
template one state punishing another through application of some 
form of duty, quota, or ban for failure to enforce human rights norms 
domestically. Claims for compensation that are targeted against an 
individual firm for specific conduct are far more economically 
efficient and do not raise the potential for conflicts with multilateral 
trade regimes. 
More importantly, however, the inclusion of a mechanism such as 
the one proposed herein improves upon the existing trends in inter-
national law, which have been leading towards the protection of indi-
vidual rights by individuals as against individuals. It is recognized that 
the international legal landscape contains far more actors and inter-
ests than those of nation-states. The possibility of compensation being 
awarded under the proposed mechanism also provides a possible in-
centive for effective monitoring and prosecution of individual claims 
byNGOs.18 
The remedy of compensation for the breach of a human rights 
obligation has a long history in international treaty practice.I9 While 
most treaties also provide for various forms of special or declarative re-
lief, the prospect of receiving compensation not only provides the vic-
tims of human rights abuses with recognition and acknowledgement of 
the wrongs that have been committed, but it also provides them with a 
means of beginning to rebuild their lives. Accordingly, the principle of 
entitlement to compensation has been included in a draft Statement of 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law.20 In particular, the draft text provides: "In cases where the viola-
18 Under international investment agreements and mixed claims jurisprudence, the only 
remedy for a breach is the payment of compensation. Compensation would accordingly be 
the only remedy available under the proposed human rights protection mechanism. 
19 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 11, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 
116; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signattae Dec. 16, 1966, 
art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, art. 6, 660 U.N.T.S. 211, 222; G.A. 
Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989); G.A. Res. 
217A(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Basic P1inciples and Guide-
lines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of Intcmational Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., 
Annex, Provisional Agenda Item ll(d), pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (2000) [here-
inafter Principles & Guidelines]. 
2° See generally P1inciples & Guidelines, supra note 19. 
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tion is not attributable to the State, the party responsible for the viola-
tion should provide reparation to the victim or to the State if the State 
has already provided reparation to the victim. "21 
IV. THE BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER THE PROPOSED MECHANISM 
Under conventional international human rights law, states are 
obliged to ensure that each of their citizens enjoys basic rights and free-
doms-not only insofar as states must not breach such rights or free-
doms-but also by ensuring that the necessary legal and political condi-
tions exist that will promote and protect the enjoyment of such rights 
and freedoms. This general obligation also includes the need to safe-
guard the rights of citizens as against the conduct of non-state actors. 
This line of reasoning was elaborated in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, in 
which the futer-American Court of Human Rights concluded that Hon-
duras was responsible for the extrajudicial disappearance of Mr. Rodri-
guez at the hands of individuals acting as government agents.22 
The court further concluded that the failure of the state appara-
tus to provide any sort of protection or remedy for Mr. Rodriguez 
constituted a violation of his rights under the American Convention 
on Human Rights.23 The existence of such a duty implies that at least 
some, if not many, forms of non-state activity must be relevant for the 
protection of individual human rights. It is interesting to note that 
most international investment agreements actually contain a custom-
ary international law exhortation to provide "full protection and se-
curity" to the investments of foreign investors. If such an obligation is 
to be imposed on states in respect of how they treat aliens and foreign 
investments, surely it must exist in respect of the kinds of treatment 
that must today be provided to individuals under modern interna-
tional human rights law.24 
21 Id. para. 17. On January 23,2002, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights affirmed 
a "deep" commitment to the finalization of this statement, although it would apparently go 
no further at that time. ld. 
22 VCltisquez. Rodriguez. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, reprinted in 9 HuM. RTs. 
LJ. 212, 242-43 (1988). 
25 !d. para. 182., at 243. 
24 Historically, states were free to treat their own citizens as poorly as they desired so 
long as a "minimum standard of treatment" was provided to aliens (ie., foreign investors). 
See, e.g., The United States of America On Behalf of George W. Hopkins, Claimant, v. The United 
Mexican States (Docket No. 39) (1926), reprinted in 21 AM. J. INTL. L. 160, 166-67 (1927) 
("[I]t not infrequently happens that under the rules of international law applied to con-
troversies of an international aspect a nation is required to accord to aliens broader and 
more liberal treatment than it accords to its own citizens under its municipal laws .... The 
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But what kind of "activities" undertaken by the investor /invest-
ment should be the subject of a human rights claim? International law 
purists might argue that international human rights conventions im-
pose little or no obligations on the activities of non-state actors and, to 
the extent that they do impose obligations, their breach is a matter of 
dispute between the states tl1at are party to the applicable treaty. As dis-
cussed above, this is far too narrow a reading of the state of the interna-
tional legal order today. Non-state actors have disparate and easily 
identifiable interests that do not necessarily conform to those of any 
particular state. These interests may themselves conflict among differ-
ent types of non-state actors (here, the interests of transnational corpo-
rations, potential human rights claimants, and NGOs). In addition to 
possessing international legal interests, it would appear only prudent to 
conclude that non-state actors might also possess positive duties to act 
under such obligations. 
Professor Steven Ratner has developed a theory of legal respon-
sibility for the activities of transnational corporations under interna-
tional human rights law. His apparent goal was to formulate an objec-
tive standard through which the adjudication of human rights claims 
against transnational corporations could be pursued. Ratner notes 
first that "international law has already recognized human rights du-
ties on entities other than states," citing examples from the customary 
law of war, the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens, and the customary and treaty law of human rights 
(such as "war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, slav-
ery, forced labor, apartheid, and forced disappearances").25 He sug-
gests that the only reason that international human rights discourse 
has focused upon the responsibility of states for human rights abuses 
is that the potential for abuse has been traditionally found in the 
hands of those who control the apparatus of the state.26 As non-state 
actors take on more significant powers and/ or authority that has been 
(implicitly or explicitly) delegated from states, it is only logical to 
conclude that their potential for liability under international human 
rights law should be similarly expanded. It is not a matter of divining 
"new" human rights; it is simply a matter of noting that there may be 
citizens of a nation may enjoy many rights which are withheld from aliens, and, conversely, 
under international law aliens may enjoy rights and remedies which the nation does not 
accord to its own citizens."). 
25 Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Themy of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE LJ. 443, 466-67 (2001). 
26 Id. at 468-69. 
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multiple actors against whom existing rights can be exercised. Ratner 
accordingly concludes: 
H human rights are aimed at the protection of human dig-
nity, the law needs to respond to abuses that do not impli-
cate the state directly . . . . this does not mean that every-
thing that a corporation does that might deleteriously affect 
the welfare of those in the corporation's sphere of opera-
tions is a human rights abuse-just as, for example, a tax in-
crease that makes some people worse off financially is not a 
human rights abuse. Nor does it require ignoring the nexus 
to state action, as such a linkage may well serve to help clar-
ify certain duties of corporations. But it does suggest that the 
recognition of some duties of corporations, far from being at 
odds with the purpose of international human rights law, is 
wholly consonant with it.27 
Based upon Ratner's analysis, there appear to be three grounds 
for investor liability for human rights abuses under the proposed 
mechanism. First, there is responsibility for the ways in which an in-
vestor/investment abets, or can be seen as complicit in, human rights 
abuses perpetrated by state officials. Second, there is responsibility for 
acts of the investor/investment that constitute a de facto exercise of 
state power, whether delegated on an implicit or explicit basis. Finally, 
there is responsibility for acts of the investor/investment if its activi-
ties are clearly contemplated within the scope of the applicable norms 
in question. 
The first of these categories is perhaps the easiest to independ-
ently establish. How can the breach of an international human right 
be absolved simply because one of the perpetrators does not hold 
public office, particularly if the right in question is regarded as fun-
damental (with individual liability likely attaching)? Ratner correctly 
notes that there should be certain lesser (or "secondary") treaty 
breaches that might only be amenable to activities of the state; how-
ever, insofar as such obligations can be perpetrated by a non-state ac-
tor, Ratner would hold them liable.28 For example, if reports were ac-
curate that Shell Oil's subsidiary in Nigeria provided the equipment 
used by state security forces to violently repress opposition to its in-
vestment and even paid their salaries, complicity in the violation of 
27 Id. at 472. 
28 I d. at 492-93. 
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relevant obligations, such as the right to life and security of the per-
son, would rest with Shell and its investment.29 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has recently come to a similar conclusion, under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, concerning allegations that U nocal Corpora-
tion was not only aware of serious human rights abuses being commit-
ted by military personnel in connection with the construction and 
protection of a natural gas project in Burma, but that it was also com-
plicit in such abuses.30 
The second of these categories is based upon theories of attribu-
tion that have traditionally held states liable for the actions of their 
agents. 31 Essentially, if the investor I investrnen t is gran ted de facto 
dominion over a portion of territory or the provision of a particular 
service-which has happened within the context of various resource 
concession agreements between states and investors-it will be held 
responsible for its actions to the extent that a state would itself be 
held liable if it were exercising the same authority over its citizens or 
territory.32 
The third category of potential corporate responsibility applies to 
international obligations that would appear to directly address the ac-
tivities of individual, non-government actors (such as foreign inves-
tors/investments). Such obligations need not necessarily be limited to 
traditional human rights obligations. For example, the Basel Conven-
tion on the Control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste 
imposes liability directly on individuals, including corporations, and 
requires signatory states to enact domestic regulatory measures to pun-
ish offenders. 33 
Ratner even provides a better example of corporate liability from 
the field of international labor law, which appears to mirror the "indi-
rect effect" analysis that has been formulated by a WTO Panel to ex-
29 See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 7. 
30 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002). 
31 Ratner, supra note 25, at 490. 
32 Versions of the applicable types of international attribution theories can be found 
both in treaty law and international claims jurisprudence. See, e.g., North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, arts. 1502-03, 1992 WL 812398 (obliging states to be 
responsible for the actions of state enterprises and designated private monopolies acting 
under the delegated authority) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Similar theories of attribution can 
be found in the "colour of right" jurisprudence of local U.S. courts adjudicating claims 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Doe I\'. Unocal Corp., 963 F. 
Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
gg See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, arts. 2(14), 4(3), 9(5), 1673 U.N.T.S. 57, 130, 
132, 137. 
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plain the primacy of private business interests in the protection to be 
afforded by states under WfO rules. In a report on the U.S. Trade Act 
of 1974, the WfO Panel mentions the "indirect effect" of various 
wro trade obligations because of how important the relevant obliga-
tions were in terms of providing security for them to conduct their 
business.34 Similarly, Ratner, in discussing International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO) conventions, remarks: 
[B]oth the purpose of the [ILO] conventions and their word-
ing make clear that they do recognize duties on enterprises 
regarding their employees. For instance, one of the ILO's so-
called core conventions, the 1949 Convention Concerning the 
Application of the Principles of the Right To Organize and To 
Bargain Collectively, states simply, "Workers shall enjoy ade-
quate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in 
respect of their employment." While clearly an injunction to 
governments to enact legislation against certain behavior by 
industry, the obligation also entails, indeed presupposes, a 
duty on the corporation not to interfere with the ability of 
employees to form unions .... the rights to form a union and 
to strike are rights as against the employer, even if the treaties 
themselves place duties on the state. States preparing other 
conventions have, in fact, recognized this truism in textual 
terms. For example, the 1981 Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention contains six articles specifically obligating em-
ployers to attain certain standards.35 
Accordingly, to the extent that international obligations appear 
to specifically contemplate regulating the conduct of individuals or 
transnational corporations, it would appear likely that a proposed 
remedy should also contemplate action on an individual scale. 
v. THE CHOICE OF 0BLIGA TIONS 
Selecting from among the available international obligations for 
which investors/investments could be held liable under the proposed 
mechanism is a delicate task. While the business community has been 
actively involved in the development of most corporate codes, that 
participation-and its acceptance of the norms developed in each 
34 WTO Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R, paras. 7.72-73, 76-78, 81-82 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
35 Ratner, supra note 25, at 476-79 (citations omitted). 
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case-rests fundamentally on the assumption that the codes will be 
applied on a strictly voluntary (i.e., not legally binding) basis.36 Ac-
cordingly, as attractive as it may be to merely choose the norms al-
ready approved for use in any given corporate code, it would likely be 
necessary to involve the private and public sector in discussions about 
norm selection before proceeding. Another possible concern would 
be whether the potential parties to the investment treaty have actually 
ratified and adopted the treaty norms under consideration. If the host 
state has not adopted the obligation for application to its own enter-
prises, it may not be possible to expect a competing investor /invest-
ment operating in its territory to be obliged to honor the obligation 
either.37 If the "home" state of the investor has not adopted the obli-
gation, the investor may simply be discouraged from proceeding with 
what it might accordingly consider to be an unnecessarily onerous 
regulatory environment. 
Keeping these issues in mind, a good starting point might be the 
international norms referred to in the SA 8000 Standard, which con-
tains a detailed list of international obligations to which all participat-
ing firms must adhere in their daily operations, including a large num-
ber of international labor obligations.38 Firms could adopt this audit-
able quality assurance standard in order to achieve compliance under 
the proposed mechanism, based upon a "due diligence" standard of 
liability. Adoption of a due diligence standard for all obligations that 
have not attained the status of jus co gens norms-for which a strict stan-
dard of liability would be more appropriate-would permit investors to 
36 See, e.g., Kristian Ehinger, BIAC Statement, in OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 31. 
37 The combined effect of the most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment 
rules contained within the agreement would essentially oblige the host state to compensate 
the investor for any compensation that the investor would be forced to pay to a successful 
claimant. This is because the effective duty imposed by these two economic nondiscrimina-
tion rules would be for the host state to provide the best regulatory treatment available to 
the investor or its competitors, which would be the ability to ignore the human right in 
question. 
38 The list includes: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; The United Nations Convention to Eliminate All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; ILO Conventions 29 and 105 (forced & bonded 
labour); ILO Convention 87 (freedom of association); ILO Convention 98 (right to collec-
tive bargaining); ILO Conventions 100 and 111 (equal remuneration for male and female 
workers for work of equal value; discrimination); ILO Convention 135 (V.'orkers' Repre-
sentatives Convention); ILO Convention 138 & Recommendation 146 (Minimum Age 
Convention and Recommendation); ILO Convention 155 & Recommendation 164 (Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Convention and Recommendation); ILO Convention 159 (Vo-
cational Rehabilitation & Employment (Disabled Persons)); ILO Convention 177 (Home 
Work); and ILO Convention 182 (Worst Forms of Child Labour). 
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be held accountable for serious abuses but would not unduly impair 
their ability to efficiently establish and maintain their investment activ-
ity in the territory of the host states. 39 Even if the investor were not par-
ticipating in the SA 8000 Standard, the obligation to act in a diligent 
manner would require the establishment of a self-monitoring protocol 
that could significantly enhance overall compliance. 
Ratner has developed a four-step methodology for deriving and 
applying norms in any given case.4o The first two steps are particularly 
relevant for examination of the proposed mechanism. First, one must 
consider the relationship existing between the host state and the inves-
tor/investment. If the ties between an arm of the state and the inves-
tor/investment are close, such proximity may indicate either a level of 
complicity (such as the "aiding and abetting" theory adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe I v. Unocal) 41 or some form of 
agency relationship. Second, one must consider the nexus between the 
business of the investor/investment and the local population. Norms 
that directly regulate the relationship between an enterprise and its 
employees would be more likely to attract liability, as would geographi-
cal proximity of the business and local citizens. For example, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42-which is not in-
cluded in the SA 8000 Standard but certainly could be added to a hu-
man rights claim mechanism-prohibits discrimination in a manner 
that well applies to its investment's relationship with its employees. 
Moreover, Ratner suggests that it may be necessary to adopt some form 
of proportionality test in order to tailor the application of general hu-
man rights obligations (such as freedom of speech) to the particular 
circumstances of the commercial context in question. 
Ratner's methodology also touches upon the nature of the obliga-
tion in question and the corporate structure of the target firm. It is un-
necessary to apply his methodology to the generation of norms, be-
39 Another potential candidate for reference under the proposed mechanism would 
be the Universal Human Rights Guidelines for Companies, currently under consideration by a 
working party under the auspices of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, once it 
passes through the drafting stages. As this body's work is not devoted to the articulation of 
one particular set of human rights obligations, and will likely be subjected to the kind of 
wide-ranging consultation required to achieve sufficient legitimacy as to one day be ac-
cepted as legally binding, this document holds great promise as a universal reference point 
for all manifestations of the proposed mechanism. 
40 Ratner, supra note 25, at 497-99. 
41 Doe lv. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *15 (9th Cir. 2002). 
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signatm-e Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173. 
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cause we have already assessed the relative suitability of the norms cov-
ered under the SA 8000 Standard. It is also unnecessary to delve very 
deeply into the structure of the targeted firm, because the investment 
treaty onto which the proposed mechanism will be grafted already con-
tains a delineation of exactly what kinds of investors/investments may 
qualifY to bring a claim. International investment protection treaties 
permit investors to bring claims on their own behalf, or on behalf of 
their investment enterprises, in the territory of another state party. In-
vestors cannot bring claims against their home states, and investors 
cannot bring claims if their home state is not a party to the treaty. Un-
der the proposed mechanism, investors would be held liable for activi-
ties that they undertook in the territory of another state party whether 
on their own or through their investment. Potential claimants would 
not be permitted to bring claims against investors/investments that 
were not receiving the protection of the treaty. Accordingly, the ques-
tion ofwhere decisions have been made within the corporate structure 
will not be particularly relevant so long as the investment activity in 
question provides prima facie evidence that a breach may have oc-
curred. 
Under the proposed mechanism, investors/investments will at-
tract liability for conduct that breaches a series of human rights and 
labor obligations (specifically delineated in the SA 8000 Standard). 
Such liability will extend whenever the investor/investment acts on 
behalf of, or in complicity with, state agents or officials or fails to ad-
here to basic international labor and human rights obligations that 
are owed directly and specifically in relation to their treatment of 
their employees. Most claims brought under this proposed mecha-
nism would be brought by, or on behalf of, aggrieved individuals who 
would be entitled to receive damages in an amount that effectively 
''wipes out all the consequences of the illegal act. "43 
The proposed measure is artful in its simplicity-establishing a 
new quid pro quo exchange for foreign investors. There remain, how-
ever, potential objections to its adoption and use. First, there must be a 
means of preventing frivolous and vexatious claims, as well an incentive 
towards the development and application of domestic regulatory struc-
tures, that satisfies at least the minimum standards established in hu-
man rights treaties. The means of satisfYing these two requirements is 
quite simple. The treaty parties need only insert a provision requiring 
43 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Merits), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No.7, at 47 
(Sept. 13). 
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that an exhaustion of local remedies requirement be satisfied before an 
alleged victim can proceed with his or her claim. If such a provision is 
interpreted using a remedial and purposive approach, the exhaustion 
rule would not present an insurmountable obstacle in cases where the 
local legal system simply is not amenable to the efficacious processing 
of a claim. 
A second potential problem that will emerge following this ap-
proach to human rights enforcement is that a period of "patchwork" 
coverage will exist until such time as the proposed mechanism becomes 
more commonplace in the adoption or renewal of investment protec-
tion treaties. However, if the alternative being presented is the com-
plete absence of any effective means of seeking compensation for hu-
man rights abuses, a patchwork of highly effective enforcement should 
doubtlessly be the preferred choice. 
It should also be recalled that the proposed mechanism does ad-
dresses business transactions of an investment (rather than trade) 
character. In other words, the proposed mechanism will be of no use 
in cases where a firm is merely importing goods from an arm's length 
supplier that is violating human rights in another part of the world-
it only covers investment abroad. 
A third concern exists in the possibility that competitors of an in-
vestor/investment covered by the proposed mechanism will enjoy an 
unfair advantage because they cannot be made the subject of a claim. 
This concern is addressed fairly quickly because the enjoyment of a 
more favorable regulatory climate by noncovered investors/invest-
ments could well be the subject of a discrimination claim by the cov-
ered investor/investment (arguing that the host state's failure to honor 
its obligation to provide a human-rights friendly regulatory environ-
ment constitutes better treatment being accorded to noncovered com-
petitors). Accordingly, by virtue of an MFN or national treatment claim, 
the covered investor could be entitled to receive compensation from 
the host government equivalent to the competitive advantage that 
would otherwise be enjoyed by its noncovered competitors. 
Fourth, it may also be necessary for the parties who include a 
human rights claim mechanism in their investment protection 
agreement to take steps domestically to ensure that an award made 
against one of their investors can actually be enforced in their courts. 
In the absence of such statutory authority, an investor could challenge 
the award on the basis that it was not a party to the "contract" under 
which the award was rendered (i.e., the treaty in question). It may also 
be useful to consider imposing vicarious liability upon the host state 
for any awards made against an investor of another party-both to 
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ensure effective enforcement and to respect the host state's obliga-
tions to ensure that its citizens' human rights are not violated within 
its territory. 
Finally, in the event that there is simply too much resistance to 
embarking on a project in such untested waters, it may be useful to 
consider the ways in which a human rights claim mechanism could be 
introduced on a more limited basis. It may be possible, for example, 
for human rights claims to be limited to cases in which an investor has 
itself brought a claim for a breach of the treaty that has resulted in a 
loss to its investment. In such instances, the treaty could authorize a 
counterclaim to be brought by the host state on behalf of its citizens 
who may have suffered losses arising out of illegal conduct by the in-
vestment enterprise.44 
In fact, it could be argued that, under most investment protec-
tion treaties, host states already possess the ability to bring a counter-
claim against the investor for a breach of international law in relation 
to the activities of the investment in its territory. It would be better, 
nonetheless, if future investment protection treaties specifically de-
lineated that, just as states are obligated to treat foreign investments 
"in accordance with international law," so too must corporations treat 
the host state and its citizens in accordance with international law. It 
would also be prudent to clarify that the opportunity to launch a 
counterclaim (or perhaps an independent claim) for the breach of 
such a right by an investor /investment exists under the applicable 
investment protection treaty. 
Of course, limiting the prosecution of human rights breaches by 
transnational corporations to counterclaims, or only to claims that 
must be subrogated to the discretionary prosecution of the host state, 
does not answer the problem of where an investor and the host gov-
ernment are working in complicity to violate human rights norms. 
Moreover, the problem of selective or vexatious prosecution might 
also arise if the state, rather than the claimant herself, is left in com-
mand of the right to bring a claim.45 
44 The state practice of subrogating the claims of citizens is, after all, exactly the same 
place from which investment protection regimes originally grew. 
45 Cases of discriminatory or inequitable prosecution of a human rights claim against a 
transnational corporation by a state could well be construed as a breach of the underlying 
investment protection treaty provisions (requiring "fair and equitable" treatment, national 
treatment, and MFN treatment), but the immediate effect of such conduct would be to dam-
age the investor/investment-forcing it to spend precious resources in its own defense. 
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CoNCLUSION 
The international legal landscape has undergone a sea of change 
over the past five decades, and two of the most prominent areas that 
have affected, and been affected by, this change are international 
economic law and international human rights. Both systems of law 
have moved towards the articulation of non-state rights and interests 
in both norm development and in prosecution of norms. By grafting 
a human rights claim mechanism onto the existing structure of inter-
national investment protection treaties, one can both recognize the 
growing place of the transnational corporation in human rights law 
and practice and improve upon the Achilles heel of human rights-
effective enforcement. Through the establishment of an effective en-
forcement mechanism (perhaps based upon the draft provisions ap-
pended below), voluntary codes of corporate conduct can move from 
the realm of a public relations exercise to the role of an educative 
compliance mechanism. Without effective enforcement, human 
rights law will remain the weak sibling of international economic law. 
The citizens of this world deserve better. 
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Appendix: Draft Treaty Provisions 
Article !-International Law 
1. Whenever making, or operating, an investment in the territory of 
another Party, the investors of a Party must act in accordance with 
international law, as set out in the obligations listed by the Parties 
in Schedule A to this Section. 
Article 2-Claim by the National of a Party 
1. The nationals of a Party may submit to arbitration under this Sec-
tion a claim that an investor of another Party has breached an obli-
gation listed in Schedule A of this Section and that the national has 
suffered loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach. 
2. For greater certainty, the nationals of a Party may only submit a 
claim under this provision in respect of the actions of an Investor 
of a Party, or its failure to act, in relation to any investment that it 
owns or controls directly or indirectly in the territory of the Party 
of that national. 
Article 3-Settlement of Disputes Between a National of a Party and 
an Investor of Another Party 
1. Except as otherwise provided in this Section, the provisions for the 
settlement of disputes between a Party and an investor of another 
Party shall govern the settlement of disputes under this Section, 
where "disputing national" should be substituted for "disputing in-
vestor" as required. 
Article 4-Consent to Arbitration 
1. Each Party consents to the submission of a claim to arbitration in 
accordance with the procedures set out in this Section. 
Article 5-Enforcement of Awards Against an Investor 
1. Each Party agrees to amend its statutes or regulations to ensure 
that any awards made by a Tribunal under this Section may be en-
forced against the Investors of a Party within its territory. 
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Article 6-Enforcement of Awards Against a Party 
1. Final awards granted against the investor of a Party under this Sec-
tion shall be considered to be a final award made against the Party 
in whose territory the investor made or operated the investment 
that was the subject of the claim for which the final award was ren-
dered. 
Article 7-Constitution of a Tribunal When a Party Fails to Appoint 
an Arbitrator or the Disputing Parties Are Unable to Agree 
on a Presiding Arbitrator 
1. The President of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague 
shall serve as the appointing authority for an arbitration under this 
Section. 
